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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AT THE TIME OF THE INJURY COMPLAINED OF 
IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT (TORTS OF BAD 
FAITH AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS) PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AN 
EMPLOYEE OF DEFENDANTS 
In its reply brief, defendants argue that the Plaintiff 
could not maintain an action against them because the 
Plaintiff was their employee and, thus, barred by the Utah 
worker's compensation statute. U.C.A. §35-1-60. 
However, at the time that the torts of bad faith and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress arose Plaintiff 
was no longer employed by the Defendants. (115, Appellant's 
Statement of Facts, Appellant's Brief). 
In their argument to the Court of Appeals, Defendant's 
totally ignore the fact that, at the time the torts 
complained of arose, Plaintiff was no longer an employee of 
the Defendants and, therefore, no longer covered under the 
Utah worker's compensation statute exclusivity provision. 
POINT 11 
PLAINTIFF HAD NO GUARANTEE THAT DEFENDANT 
WOULD COMPLY WITH ORDERS OF THE UTAH 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Defendants argue that the Industrial Commission had 
continuing jurisdiction over the claims of the Plaintiff and 
it would have been a simple matter to go back to the 
1 
Commission and to have the Commission order that the 
Defendant's comply with the previous order of the 
Commission. 
However, in this case, the Plaintiff already had an 
order from the Commission (which order the Defendant's 
attorney wrote) and which order the Defendant's were 
ignoring. (1JU15-22, Appellant's Statement of Facts, 
Appellant's Brief; R. 224-225, 243-262). 
If the Defendant's had complied with the Order of the 
Commission in the first place, the Plaintiff would have had 
no necessity to bring an action against the Defendants. 
It was reasonable for the Plaintiff to assume that if 
the Defendant's were going to ignore one Order of the 
Commission (which Defendant's attorney wrote), they would 
ignore others. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAD PRIVITY OF CONTRACT 
WITH THESE DEFENDANTS AND, THEREFORE, 
COULD MAINTAIN A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
BAD FAITH 
Defendant's argue that Plaintiff had no privity of 
contract with them and therefore, under the rational of 
Savage v. Educator's Insurance Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 
1995), she could not bring an action for bad faith against 
them. 
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However, Defendant's argument ignores the facts of the 
corporate structure of the Defendants and the Plaintiff 
relationship with them. In this case, Payless ShoeSource, 
Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of May Department Stores 
Company which, in turn, has as part of it the Western Region 
Claims office, which administers May's self-insured worker's 
compensation insurance. 
In this case, the Defendant's were the self-insurer for 
worker's compensation matters, the insured for such worker's 
compensation matters and the administrator of the worker's 
compensation insurance and claims. But, in addition to 
wearing all of those hats, and most importantly for this 
case, the Defendant's were also the employer of the 
Plaintiff. Through such employment of the Plaintiff by the 
Defendant's, Plaintiff had privity of contract with the 
Defendant's. 
Defendant's argument, therefore, misapplies Savage. 
Defendant's should not be allowed to take the economic 
advantage of being the insurer, the self-insured and the 
self-administer of their worker's compensation insurance 
(wear all of the hats) and then also get the advantage of 
saying that there is no privity of contract as an employer 
when there is clearly such privity with this Plaintiff. 
In any event, the facts in this case are clearly 
different than the facts set forth in Savage. In Savage, 
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Granite school district was the insured. Savage worked for 
the school district. The school district hired Educator's 
Insurance Co. as the insurer and the administrator of the 
district's worker's compensation insurance. Educator's was 
a distinct entity from Granite school district. There was 
no privity between Savage and Educator's in Savage. Such is 
not the case in this matter. 
POINT IV 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ALONE, WITHOUT PHYSICAL 
INJURY, IS ENOUGH TO RAISE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION UNDER UTAH LAW 
In Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970 
(Utah 1993), Justice Durham notes that the plaintiff's 
themselves inhaled asbestos. However, Justice Durham also 
notes that: 
"In some cases, a plaintiff may be eligible to 
recover for NIED although no one in the case was 
subject to bodily harm. (Citation omitted) In 
that event, a foreseeability test as outlined in 
subsection (1) of section 313 [Restatement 
(Second) of Torts] would be appropriate to 
evaluate liability. . . . I would leave to a 
future case the parameters of a pure fore-
seeability test, but I note that such a test is 
appropriate under subsection (1). (Emphasis added) 
Id. at fn. 4, p. 974. 
In Hansen, Justice Durham was careful to note that the 
language of §313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts allows 
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recovery for "illness c^r bodily harm". (Emphasis Justice 
Durham's). As she stated in Hansen, 
The drafters' use of "or" rather than "and" shows 
an intention to allow plaintiff to recover not 
only where bodily harm results from emotional 
trauma, but where "illness" results as well. 
"Illness" is "an unhealthy condition of body or 
mind" Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 566 
(1981). From this we conclude that either 
physical or mental illness may support the NIED 
cause of action. 
Id. at 975. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiff was not, at the time the torts of bad 
faith and negligent infliction of emotional distress arose, 
an employee of the Defendant's the exclusivity provision of 
the Utah worker's compensation statute does not come into 
play. 
Plaintiff had not guarantee that Defendant's would obey 
a further order of the Utah Industrial Commission when the 
Defendant's had already chosen to ignore or disobey the 
initial order of the Commission. 
Section 3131 provides: 
(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to 
another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness 
or bodily harm if the actor 
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable 
risk of causing the distress, otherwise then by knowledge of the harm or 
peril of a third person, and 
(b) from the facts known to him should have realized that the 
distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. 
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Plaintiff, as the employee of the Defendant's, was in 
privity of contract such that she could raise a claim of bad 
faith against her self-insured, self-administering employer. 
Utah law allows a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress based solely upon mental anguish, without 
need for a showing of physical harm or injury. 
The Court should reverse the summary judgment granted 
by the court below and return the matter for trial. 
DATED this /iCg^day of September, 1997. 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By^ 
C_iBOnARD E. McGEE 
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